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WILDLIFE RIGHTS: THE EVER-WIDENING 
CffiCLE 
BY 
DAVID s. FAVRE. 
It is becoming increasingly evident that the American legal 
system has begun to recognize and implement a new area of law 
expressly concerned with the rights of animals. While the term 
"wildlife rights" may seem conceptually awkward, recent federal 
legislation' and its judicial interpretation is creating a body of law 
responsive to contemporary concerns regarding animal-human re-
lationships2 in order to control some of the more serious conflicts 
between animals and humans. 3 
The suggestion that entities other than human beings should 
be allowed access to the judicial system was first proposed by 
Professor Christopher Stone in 1972.' He argued that the interests 
of natural objects, such as rivers, forests, mountains and lakes, 
should be represented in court, and he suggested that humans and 
their organizations act as guardians and file lawsuits on behalf of 
• Associate Professor of Law, Detroit College of Law; B.A. University of Vir-
ginia; J.D., William and Mary College, 1973. The author would like to acknowledge 
the able assistance given to him by Eric Kaiser, Class of 1979. 
1. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1976); Marine 
Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1976); National Environ-
mental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1970); Wild Free-Roaming 
Horses and Burros Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1976). 
2. In an article, Talking to Animals Raises Questions, Joan Beck notes: 
If an animal learns to communicate in human words and can converse about 
its wants, hopes, fears, thoughts, and sense of self-identity, can it still be 
considered "Animal" subjected to captivity and research? The question is 
no longer academic and speculative. It's become a moral and practical con-
cern for those involved in successful programs to teach language to chimpan-
zees, gorillas, and dolphins. And now it's a legal question as well. 
Detroit Free Press, July 25, 1977, § A, at 11. See also Lubow, Riot in Fish Tank II, 
New Times, October 14, 1977, at 36; and Holden, Endangered Species: Review of 
Law Triggered by Tellico Impasse, 196 SciENCE 1426 (1977). 
3. "Animal" refers to all nonhuman members of the animal kingdom. While 
the terms "wildlife" and "animal" are often used interchangeably, for the purposes 
of this Article, "wildlife" does not include domestic animals. There is no conceptual 
reason why the arguments and concerns of this Article could not be extended to 
include the plant kingdom. 
4. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? - Toward Legal Rights for Natural 
Objects, 45 S. CALIF. L. REv. 450 (1972). 
HeinOnline -- 9 Envtl. L.  242 1978-1979
242 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 9:241 
endangered natural objects.5 While Stone's article did not address 
the issue of wildlife rights directly, his environmental perspective 
was in many ways the logical forerunner of a legal analysis in 
support of wildlife rights. 
More recently, other commentators have focused specifically 
on the rights of animals.8 One author recognized that animals are 
"sentient living creatures" that should be the holders of legal 
rights7 and suggested a Model Act which prescribed the standards 
of care for three different classes of animals.8 The higher the intel-
ligence of the animal the more protection it would receive.9 In a 
narrower context, a student comment suggested imposing the du-
ties and responsibilities of guardianship on any human possessing 
a dog or a cat10 and argued that such guardianship rights were 
justified on the basis that dogs and cats are capable of feeling 
pain. 11 
Although animals suffer pain and have varying levels of intel-
ligence, there are more fundamental reasons supporting the case 
for animal rights. This Article will first explore how the history of 
human-animal relationships has shaped man's attitude toward 
animals. Next, it will examine the basic concept of "rights." It will 
consider whether wildlife could conceptually be a holder of rights 
and why wildlife are deserving of legal rights. The ecological and 
biological ties between humans and animals will be highlighted in 
an effort to demonstrate that humans and animals are interrelated 
~·I • 
creatures sharmg the same ecosystem and dependent on one an-
other for survival. This perspective suggests that there is no longer 
any reason to draw a sharp line granting humans many legal rights 
and wildlife none. Finally, the Article will propose three categories 
5. ld. at 457-89. 
6. Burr, Toward Legal Rights for Animals, 4 ENVT'L AFF. 205 (1975); Comment, 
Rights for Non-Human Animals: A Guardianship Model for Dogs and Cats, 14 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 484 (1977). 
7. Burr, supra note 6, at 228. 
8. ld. at 232-43. 
9. For example, in the Model Act, a Class A animal is defined as a chimpanzee, 
gorilla or dolphin, Class B is any mammal, and Class C is any vertebrate. Id. at 
233-34. The comment section of the Act states that "[t]he definition of animal 
claBSes is tied to the relative advancement of the animal on the evolutionary scale, 
and reflects a presumption that the closer the animal is to man, the more deserving 
it is of protection." /d. at 234. The fact that animals have different levels of intellig-
ence, however, does not automatically suggest a legal or moral presumption. 
10. Comment, supra note 6. 
11. ld. at 497. 
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of legal rights-property, individual and species rights-to best 
protect the interests of wildlife. Since there is no legal basis to 
allow for the recognition of these rights, an amendment to the 
United States Constitution will be proposed. While such a pro-
posal might seem premature, it is offered at this time to stimulate 
a full and open discussion of the many complex issues concerning 
wildlife rights. 
I. THE HISTORICAL ATTITUDE TowARD ANIMALS 
A. Ancient Times 
The legal principles governing the relationship between hu-
mans and animals have remained constant through all of recorded 
history. In Western civilization, the basic moral and philosophical 
premise circumscribing this relationship was set out in the Bible.t2 
The Biblical attitude of human dominion over animals was echoed 
in Roman law, which described animals as one category of personal 
property.t3 Under Roman law, title to wild animals could be ob-
tained only by exhibiting physical control of the animal. 14 Once 
ownership arose, most of the rules governing the ownership of per-
sonal property were applied to the rights of humans to possess and 
12. "Then God Said, 'Let us make man in our image, after our likeness; 
and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the birds of 
the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping 
thing that creeps upon the earth.' So God created man in his own image, in 
the image of God he created him; male and female he created them. And 
God blessed them, and God said to them, 'Be fruitful and multiply, and fill 
the earth and subdue it; and have dominion over the fish of the sea and over 
the birds of the air and over every living thing that moves upon the earth.' " 
Genesis 1:26-28. See aL~o Genesis 1:20-31, 9:1-3. 
13. This perspective was first committed to writing by Justinian in his book 
On the Division of Things. I. JusTINIAN, THE INSTITUTES OF JusTINIAN 66 (book II, 
title I, § 12, North-Holland ed. J. Thomas trans. 1975) [hereinafter cited as 
JuSTINIAN]. The governing principle of Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. 1805), 
was derived from this theory. In that case, the New York Court for the Correction 
of Errors held that a plaintiff pursuing a fox which his dogs had aroused had no 
rights against a defendant who intervened and, in the plaintiff's sight, shot and 
carried away the animal. The court found that the mere chase of wild animals did 
not in itself give any prior rights to the huntsman or fisherman. Furthermore, the 
court asserted that title to the animal is acquired by taking possession, so that the 
first possessor becomes the owner of the property. 
14. JusTINIAN, supra note 13, at 66 (book II, title I, § 12). The concept of title 
by possession was adopted nearly word for word in civil law (Art. 3415 French Civil 
Law) and emerged in American common law as well. 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 
403 (Dawson's of Pall Mall reprint ed. 1966). 
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control animals. Apparently the animals themselves had no rights 
or protection under Roman law. Moreover, Roman law did not 
regulate which animals could be possessed, when they could be 
reduced to possession or what could be done with them once owned 
by humans. 
Nevertheless, animals were an integral part of Roman culture. 
Wild animals were a principal source of entertainment15 as well as 
an inspiration for works of art, 18 but this exposure and interaction 
did not engender the sense of reverence for animals that existed in 
Egyptian and Greek cultures.t7 Instead, the Romans treated ani-
mals with perverse cruelty, manifesting their belief that animals 
existed for the use and pleasure of mankind. The exhibition of 
great masses of exotic wild animals (gathered and transported at 
no small cost) often climaxed in their slaughter. It is paradoxical 
that a culture which sought out wild animals for their grace and 
beauty also found "pleasure in the often hideous sufferings and 
agonizing deaths of quantities of magnificent and noble crea-
tures."18 
Before and during the Roman period, the Jewish culture mani-
fested a distinctly different attitude toward animals. The Jewish 
interpretation of Biblical law prohibited cruelty to animals and 
seemed to profess a concern for the animals' well-being.t9 Addition-
ally, the killing of animals for sport was considered an improper 
pursuit.20 
Surprisingly, references to and concerns for animals do not 
15. J.M.C. TOYNBEE, ANIMALS IN ROMAN LiFE AND ART 17 (1973) [hereinafter 
cited as TOYNBEE). 
16. /d. at 21. 
17. 2 HERODOTUS, THE HISTORIES § 65. See G. CARSoN, MEN, BEAST AND GoDs 
8-10 (1972). 
18. Concerning the destruction of exhibited animals, Toynbee related the fol-
lowing facts and figures: . 
[I]n 13 BC 600 African beasts were slain; in 2 BC 260 lions were slaughtered 
in the Circus Maximus and 36 crocodiles in the Circus Flaminius; and in AD 
12 there was another slaughter of wild beasts . . . including 200 lions. In one 
of Gaius' shows 400 bears a~d 400 other Libyan beasts were killed; under 
Claudius, 300 bears and 300 Libyan beasts; and Nero's bodyguard brought 
down with javelins 400 bears and 300 lions. 
TOYNBEE, supra note 15, at 21 (footnotes omitted). 
19. G. HoROWITZ, THE SPIRIT OF JEWISH LAw 105-19 (1953); G. CARSON, supra 
note 17, at 13-15; C. NIVEN, HISTORY OF THE HUMANE MOVEMENT 13-14, 22 (1967). 
20. G. HoROWITZ, supra note 19, at 114-15. 
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exist in the New Testament of the Bible.21 As the Catholic Church 
grew in scope and power during the Dark and Middle Ages, a 
concern for animals was never expressed. St. Thomas Aquinas 
stated the Church's position: "[F)or by divine providence they 
[animals] are intended for man's use in the natural order. Hence 
it is no wrong for man to make use of them either by killing or in 
any other way whatever."22 The contrasting historical attitudes in 
the Jewish and Catholic religions are representative of the dichot-
omy of views held in modem society. 
Finally, the important corollary issue of protecting animal 
species from extinction was never addressed in ancient times. 
None of the early writers voiced concern that an animal species 
might be endangered by human activities.23 
B. Early English Law 
The view that animal ownership was determined by posses-
sion found fertile ground in the laws of England, and after several 
centuries of percolating through English common law, a complex 
set of rules developed.2• English law first reflected the Roman's 
concept of free access to all animals without state interference but 
was later modified on behalf of the Crown to permit the taking of 
a game animal only with royal permission. Over time, statutes 
were passed which gave the right to hunt game to the landed 
gentry. 25 This concept, that some individuals had more rights to 
take animals than others, had not existed under Roman law. The 
major reason for this new development was the different role which 
animals played in English society. 
21. G. CARSON, supra note 19, at 14-15; C. NIVEN, supra note 19, at 23. 
22. 3 T. AQUINAS, SuMMA CoNTRO GENTILES, in T. REGAN & P. SINGER, ANIMAL 
RIGHTS AND HUMAN OBLIGATIONS 59 (1976). See also C. NIVEN, supra note 19, at 31-
32. 
23. I. DOUGLAS-HAMILTON & 0. DOUGLAS-HAMILTON, AMONG THE ELEPHANTS'243-
46 (1975). The authors discuss the extensive system employed prior to and during 
Roman time to capture and use elephants and their ivory, which resulted in the 
extinction of the species over a wide geographical area. 
24. 1 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND, ANIMALS (2d ed. 1931) [hereinafter cited 
as 1 HALSBURY's]; 25 HALSBURY'S LAws OF ENGLAND, GAME (2d ed. 1931) [hereinafter 
cited as 25 HALSBURY'S]. See generally SELDEN SOCIETY, SELECT PLEAS OF THE FOREST 
(1901); M. BEAN, THE EvoLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAw, 8-12 (1977) (Council 
on Environmental Quality). 
25. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 14, at 391-95; 1 HALSBURY'S, supra note 24, at 531-
33; 25 HALSBURY's, supra note 24, at 412-17. 
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For the English peasant, wild animals were simply a source of 
food and goods; however, the nobles, and in particular the king, 
viewed the uses of animals differently. In a society with few trans-
ferable symbols of wealth, such as silver and gold, animals played 
a major role in differentiating between the powerful and the peas-
ant. Some animals, such as the whale, were regarded as royal 
animals that could only be taken by the king or by obtaining his 
permission.28 Other animals were reserved for ownership by the 
king and the landed gentry. 27 Thus, animals were often the object 
of protective legislation, not out of concern for the animals them-
selves, but because the animals and the right to kill them were 
reserved for the upper class. Additionally, animal protection, often 
accomplished by outlawing the possession of certain weapons, was 
also aimed at keeping the peasants weaponless and retaining class 
distinctions. 28 
One of the first English statutes protecting wild animals was 
passed in 1581 for the "preservation of pheasants and partridges. " 29 
The preamble to this act stated that "[t]he game of pheasants 
and partridges is within these few years in manner utterly decayed 
and destroyed in all parts of this realm . . . . "30 The statute 
prohibited any person from taking birds in the night and outlawed 
26. 25 HALSBURY'S, supra note 24, at 121. 
27. See essay by M. Wolfe in W.F. SIGLES, WILDLIFE LAW ENFORCEMENT 5·9 
(1972). 
28. T. Lund, British Wildlife Law Before the American Revolution, 74 MICH. 
L. REv. 49 (1975); 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 14, at 404·19. 
The following act was passed in 1562 to address the concerns of the Queen and 
various noblemen: 
[T]o their great cost and charge . . . have erected and made in and upon 
their several demeans, grounds and possessions . . . pools . . . motes, pits 
or pond for the increase of fish ... (2) and also have imbarked invironed 
and enclosed parcels of their said demeans, soils . . . for the breeding . . . 
of red [and] fallow deer ... (3) and also having breeding within their woods 
and grounds diverse eyries of hawks of sundry kind ... (4) [said previously 
mentioned places] . . . have been from time to time by evil disposed per-
sons, of a very evil, willful and insolent disposition and of malice and dis plea· 
sure . . . broke, cut down and set open, and the deer and hawks within the 
same taken destroid, carried away and stolen . . . . 
5 Eliz. ch. 21 (1562), contained in 6 Perkering Stat. at Large 212 (1763). The statute 
also makes the aggrieved actions unlawful. While it afforded some animals protec-
tion, it was intended to protect the property and wealth of nobles and the Queen 
and was not enacted out of any concern for the animals themselves. 
29. 23 Eliz. ch. 10 (1581), contained in 6 Perkering Stat. at Large 346 (1763). 
30. ld. 
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the hawking of the birds in com fields. 31 By limiting the time and 
manner of hunting, the birds received some protection. However, 
the law was not enacted for the purpose of recognizing the right of 
species to exist; rather, it was aimed at protecting a food source 
and preserving the gentleman's sport of hunting. 
C. Early American Law 
During the early years of the colonial period, Americans tried 
to adopt the English class system and the English method of con-
trolling wildlife. This attempt was frustrated by the vastness of the 
American continent, and the "free taking" of wildlife ultimately 
became the acceptable practice. The complexities of the English 
law governing the taking of wild animals were stripped back to the 
bare Roman bones, which permitted anyone who captured or killed 
wild animals to obtain title to them. Thus, the right of all people 
to fish and hunt, even on another's land, often was recognized 
despite the law of trespass.32 
With the legal problems of wildlife taking simplified, wildlife 
assumed an important role in the economy of the early American 
colonies: 
Deer, turkeys, and other products of the chase provided a ready 
supply of fresh meat until the colonists could develop their own 
domesticated flocks and herds. The wild birds and mammals also 
became an important source of income. Furs, deer hides, and the 
down and plumes of birds brought high prices in European markets. 
All were readily available in the vicinity of the early French, Eng-
lish, and Dutch settlements along the Atlantic Coast.33 
From the 1600s to the early 1800s, the economic and internal 
growth needs of the United States governed the exploitation of 
wildlife. Animals provided a source of income and food for entre-
preneurs and market hunters. Moreover, hunters were indepen-
dent by nature and felt they were beyond the reach of law. The 
frontier attitudes of the rugged individualists ultimately created a 
situation beyond the control of the early state govemments.34 
31. See Matthew Bacon's discussion of Game for further reference to early 
protective laws: 3M. BACON, LAW 324 (Bird Wilson, Am. ed. 1813). 
32. Lund, Early American Wildlife Law, 51 N.Y.L. REv. 703, 712-14 (1976). 
See generally M. BEAN, supra note 24, at 12-20. 
33. J. TREFETHEN, AN AMERICAN CRUSADE FOR WILDLIFE 29 (1975). 
34. /d. at 41-65. 
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There were attempts, however, by various state legislatures to 
control wildlife. The states wished to guarantee the continued ex-
istence of the beneficial species for trade or food while exterminat-
ing the harmful species. For example, as a response to a serious 
decline in the number of white-tailed deer in colonized areas, var-
ious types of legislation were passed. The most common statute 
created closed seasons during which hunting was banned. How-
ever, due to the lack of enforcement capabilities and the indepen-
dent attitude of the market hunter, these laws were of little actual 
protection, and gradually the white-tailed deer was eliminated 
from many of the Eastern states. aa 
Another common statute was the bounty law. Such laws were 
enthusiastically enacted to eliminate predators which the colonists 
perceived as a threat to either their domestic livestock or to the 
species of wildlife preferred by hunters. By the mid-1700s, it be-
came an established practice for the state to offer money in return 
for dead animals. Mountain lions, wolves, bears and wildcats 
topped most of the lists.aa'Early America's indifference to protect-
ing and preserving wildlife was most apparent in the area of species 
preservation. Animals were viewed in the strictest Biblical sense 
as existing solely for the use of man. In the United States, animals 
were consumed or forced out of their natural habitats as Manifest 
Destiny pushed its way across the continent. Several species were 
driven to total extinction by economic .incentives, habitat destruc-
tion and general indifference.87 Even more surprising is the list of 
animals driven to near extinction. By 1900, almost every species 
of large mammal in the continental United States had been elimi-
nated from most of its original living range.38 One prime example 
of the early American attitude toward species preservation was an 
35. /d. at 39-40, 244-46. See Lund, supra note 32, 709-25; G. CARSON, supra note 
17, at 66. 
36. Lund, supra note 32, at 727-29. See J. TREFETHEN, supra note 33, at 35-37. 
Many of these species now appear on the threatened and endangered list published 
by the Department of Interior. In 50 .C.F.R. § 17.11 (1977), the brown bearislisted 
as threatened and the eastern timber wolf as endangered. The long-eared kit fox, 
Florida wolf and eastern cougar are considered extinct in the eastern U.S. S. REP. 
No. 1136, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 265 (1972). 
37. The list includes the eastern bison, the sea mink, the Labrador duck, the 
Carolina parakeet, the heath hen and the passenger pigeon. R. McCLUNG, LosT 
WILD AMERICA 28-53 (1969); J. TREFETHEN, supra note 33, at 63-65. 
38. For example, the white-tailed deer, elk, mountain sheep, bear, pronghorn 
antelope, and the buffalo were all substantially reduced in numbers and restricted 
in habitat. J. TREFETHEN, supra note 33, at 3-17, 243-56. 
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1874 act of Congress passed "to prevent the useless slaughters of 
the Buffaloes within the territories of the United States. "38 On the 
advice of General Sherman, President Grant pocket-vetoed the 
bill. Sherman apparently believed that destroying the buffalo 
would result in better control over the Indians by reducing their 
incentive and ability to move off the reservation. 
In addition to their economic value, animals were used by the 
first settlers as a source of entertainment. These amusements in-
cluded live bird shoots, raccoon and bear. baiting, cock fights and 
the ever-present circus and road-side zoo. The killing of wildlife for 
human recreation and pleasure, while never on the grandiose scale 
of the Romans, was continually present in America's past and 
continues unabated in many cases in the 20th century.40 
Wildlife, therefore, played a substantial role in the settlement 
and economic development of the colonies. It was viewed as an-
other resource commodity, like forests or mineral deposits, and 
contributed its share to a strong and expanding economy. Ironi-
cally, the financial growth of 19th century America proved to be 
the foundation out of which developed more modem concerns for 
wildlife. · 
D. The Roots of America's Present Concern for Wildlife 
As a result of industrial growth in the early 1800s, wealth 
began to accumulate in a new class of individuals. The members 
of this class had the leisure time t6 explore their interests and 
concerns and the prestige and power to effectuate their desires. 
Within this new class, three groups of people were primarily re-
sponsible for generating a concern for wildlife: the sportsman-
hunter, the urban well-to-do and the scientist. The wildlife conser-
vation efforts of all of these groups ultimately became visible dur-
ing the Industrial Revolution. 
The sportsman-hunter is to be distinguished from the market-
hunter who made his livelihood from the killing of wildlife. In the 
mid-1800s, the market-hunters were causing such negative im-
pacts that sportsman-hunters feared their sport would be seriously 
infringed upon or even eliminated. Out of this selfish motivation, 
39. H.R. 921, 43d Cong., 1st Sess., 1874 CoNG. REc. 5413 (1874). See J. 
TREFETHEN, supra note 33, at 16. 
40. G. CARSON, supra note 17, at 63. See E. LEAvrrr, ANIMALS AND THEIR LEGAL 
RIGHTS 110-12 (1968). 
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a crude conservation movement began, although the term 
"conservation" was unknown at that time. America's first 
conservation-oriented group, the New York Sportsmen Club, was 
formed in 1844 by eighty influential sportsmen.41 
A second group, which became prominent after the Civil War, 
promoted the humane treatment of animals. Soon after visiting 
the Humane Society of England in the 1860s, Henry Bergh organ-
ized the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals 
(ASPCA) in New York City. His efforts on behalf of animals living 
in the urbanized areas of the United States soon became a rallying 
point for many of the urban well-to-do. Companion groups were 
created in Boston and other big cities.42 Although the ASPCA and 
like organizations were initially interested in urban animals, in 
recent years they have shown concern for wildlife as well.43 
The third group concerned with preserving America's wildlife 
grew out of the scientific community. The American Ornithologist 
Union was one of the first scientific organizations to take an active 
conservation role by seeking protection for birds and their habi-
tats.44 By the end of the 1800s, the Audubon Club and Sierra Club 
had come into existence. These two organizations have consis-
tently pursued conservation and wildlife issues and are currently 
among the strongest public interest organizations in the United 
States.45 
These three interest groups spoke out in order to protect en-
dangered species of wildlife and pressed for political action on both 
41. For a detailed account of this development, see J. TREFETHEN, supra note 
33, at 69-75. This book was written for and published by the Boone and Crockett 
Club, which is itself an example of a politically powerful sportsmen's club con-
cerned about wildlife protection. It was formed in 1887 by Theodore Roosevelt.[d. 
at vii-viii. 
42. See G. CARSON, supra note 17, at 99; C. NIVEN, supra note 19, at 106. 
43. The Humane Society of the United States lists among its purposes prevent-
ing the over breeding of cats and dogs, eliminating cruel hunting practices, exposing 
the plight of research animals, eliminating the abuse of animals in entertainment 
and zoos, and stopping cruelty to animals used for food. 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
AssociATIONS 629 (12th ed. 1978). The encyclopedia lists 37 organizations that are 
primarily concerned with some aspect of animal welfare. ld. at 628-30. 
44. J. TREFETHEN, supra note 33, at 130-32; C. Buchheister & F. Graham, From 
the Swamps and Back, AUDUBON, Jan. 1973 at 7. 
45. The Sierra Club currently has 174,000 members, a staff of 130 people and 
300 regional groups; the National Audubon Society has 370,000 members and 398 
local groups. 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AsSOCIATIONS supra note 43, at 253, 370. 
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state and nationallevels.41 Over the years, a philosophy dedicated 
to the conservation of wildlife slowly developed, and it has been 
embraced by many present-day government decisionmakers. 
II. THE NEW ROLE FOR AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 
A. What is a Right? 
People make many claims about their rights and the duties 
other people and the government owe to them. However, only those 
claims that can be enforced or protected by the judicial system 
may ascend to the status of a legal right. Dean Pound has de-
scribed legal rights as "claims or demands recognized and made 
legally assertable."47 A right can guarantee the freedom to engage 
46. The early American attitude toward wildlife is portrayed in this account 
of the derivation of the word "conservation": 
The word "conservation" as it applies to natural resources did not come into 
the English language until 1907. In his autobiography, Breaking New 
Ground, Pinchot wrote that, while riding in Rock Creek Park in Washington, 
D.C., the thought occurred to him that there was no single word to describe 
the interrelationship and sustained-yield use of forests, soils, waters, fish, 
wildlife, minerals, and all other natural resources. "Protection" and 
"preservation," then in common use by contemporary authorities on 
natural- resource matters, implied non-use - a locking up of resources - a 
concept that grated on Pinchot's practical sensibilities. He discussed this 
gap in the vocabulary with a number of friends, among them Overton Price, 
an associate in the Forest Service. In this discussion, either he or Price came 
up with the word "conservation." The word apparently was derived from 
"conservator," the title of an office in colonial India under British Civil 
Service. When Pinchot discussed the newly coined term with Roosevelt, the 
President adopted it immediately and, from that point on, "conservation" 
became the keynote of the Roosevelt Administration. 
J. TREFETHEN, supra note 33, at 125-27. 
47. 4 R. PoUND, JuRISPRUDENCE§ 117, at 41 (1959). The term "rights" is one of 
the most overused and least understood legal words of art. Even after distinguishing 
the religious, moral and philosophical uses of the word, the narrower concept of 
"legal rights" is still a quagmire. Dean Pound lists five different connotations for 
the term: 
(1) One meaning is interest, as in most discussions of natural rights. Here it 
may mean (a) an interest one holds ought to be recognized and secured. It 
is generally used in this sense in treatises on ethics. Or (b) it may mean the 
interest recognized, delimited with respect to other recognized interests, and 
secured. (2) A second meaning is a recognized claim to acts or forbearances 
by another or all others in order to make the interest effective, (a) legally, 
through application of the force of a politically organized society to s·ecure it 
as the law has delimited it, or (b) morally, by the pressure of the moral 
sentiment of the community or of extra-legal agencies of social control. Ana-
lytical jurists have put this as a capacity of influencing others which is 
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in certain activities, such as freedom of the press48 or freedom of 
religion!9 A right can also act as a restraint upon the actions of 
others, as by prohibiting the government from searching the home 
of a private individual without a search warrant.50 
A right is comprised of four basic elements: (1) the holder of 
the right, (2) the act or forbearance which is governed by the right, 
(3) the "res" or thing with respect to which the right is conferred, 
and (4) the person with the duty imposed by the right. 51 Using 
freedom from warrantless search as an example, the property 
owner or lessee is the holder of the right, the act of entrance upon 
the premises is governed by the right, the property and everything 
located thereon constitute the "res" of the right, and the duty of 
seeking a search warrant is placed upon the government and its 
agents.52 In discussing "wildlife rights," the elements comprising 
a right would apply as follows: (1) individuals and species of wild-
life are the holders of rights, (2) the acts of humans are limited by 
these rights, (3) wildlife and their habitats are the "res" of the 
right, and (4) human beings and their institutions will have duties 
imposed upon them due to the recognition of these new rights. 
At the present time, the American legal system does not recog-
nize wildlife as holders of legal rights. However, many commenta-
tors on the subject of animals and the legal system use the term 
"animal rights" improperly since the right is actually possessed by 
the government or humans rather than by the animals.53 When a 
recognized or conferred in order to secure an interest. (3) A third use is to 
designate a capacity of creating, divesting or altering rights in the secorid 
sense and so of creating or altering duties. Here the proper term is "power." 
(4) A fourth use is to designate certain conditions of general or special non-
interference with natural faculties of action; certain conditions, as it were, 
of legal hands off, i.e. occasions on which the law secures interests by leaving 
one to the free exercise of his natural faculties. These are better called liber-
ties and privileges. (5) In addition, "right" is used as an adjective to mean 
that which accords with justice or that which recognizes. and gives effect to 
moral rights. 
ld. § 118, at 56-57. See also G. PATON & D. DERHAM, JuRISPRUDENCE §52, at 285 
(4th ed. 1972). 
48. U.S. CoNST. amend. I. 
49. ld. 
50. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV. 
51. 4 R. POUND, supra note 47, § 119, at 84-85; G. PATON & D. DERHAM, supra 
note 46 § 62. 
52. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643. (1961). 
53. A prime example of this is anti-cruelty legislation, which may impose 
criminal sanctions on particular activities of humans who harm animals but does 
HeinOnline -- 9 Envtl. L.  253 1978-1979
1979] WILDLIFE RIGHTS 253 
human physically assaults another human, the injured person may 
bring a civil action in tort on his own behalf against the tortfeasor. 
However, if a person assaults an animal, he may be criminally 
liable for his act, but in no state may the animal seek civil redress 
for the harm to its body. When an animal is injured, only the state 
or the animal owner may have rights arising from a breach of duty 
by the tortfeasor. Therefore, while the animal may be the "res" of 
a right, the law has never deemed an animal the holder of the right. 
Dean Pound has noted that the logical sequential order for the 
creation and recognition of rights would be interest, right, duty, 
action and remedy. However, society often begins with a remedy 
for a problem and ends up by recognizing that a person has a right 
to that remedy. 54 This sequence, rather than the logical one, is 
particularly evident in legislation affecting wildlife. For example, 
the Federal Endangered Species Act of 197355 imposes criminal 
sanctions for certain acts58 and provides for injunctive relief for 
certain governmental actions.57 While the Act does not recognize 
not give any corresponding rights to the animals themseves. See generally E. 
LEAVI'IT, supra note 40. 
54. 4 R. POUND, supra note 47, § 117, at 43. 
55. 16 u.s.c. §§ 1531-1543 (1976). 
56. The Endangered Species Act protects species that have been formally 
listed as endangered, by making certain acts unlawful: 
[W]ith respect to any endangered species of fish or wildlife listed pursuant 
to section 1533 of this title it is unlawful for any person subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States to 
(A) import any such species into, or export any such species from the 
United States; 
(B) take any such species within the United States or the territorial 
sea of the United States; 
(C) take any such species upon the high seas; 
(D) possess, sell, deliver, carry, transport, or ship, by any means 
whatsoever, any such species taken in violation of subparagraphs (B) 
and (C); 
(E) deliver, receive, carry, transport, or ship in interstate or foreign 
commerce, by any means whatsoever and in the course of a commer-
cial activity, any such species .... 
16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1) (1976). Previously, the term "take" had been defined as "to 
harass, harqt, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to 
attempt to engage in any such conduct." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(14) (1976). 
57. Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act prohibits the government from 
engaging in any action that would jeopardize an endangered species or its habitat. 
Courts have allowed private citizens to enforce this provision. The most recent case 
to arise under this section was Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, __ U.S.--· 
98 S.Ct. 2279 (1978). See text accompanying notes 125-32 infra. The code section 
reads in part: 
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any interest that may be possessed by the animals themselves or 
their species, its remedial intent is the elimination of certain de-
structive human activities that would otherwise reduce wildlife 
habitats and endanger the continued existence of certain species. 
Thus, the legal system has provided a remedy without first recog-
nizing a right to that remedy. 
B. The Holder of Rights 
A key question underlying this article is whether it is concep-
tually possible for wildlife to possess rights. Under the existing 
legal system rights are allocated only to legal persons. In the broad-
est legal sense, legal persons may be defined as "units on behalf 
or in title of which legally recognized and secured interests are 
asserted."58 The largest category oflegal persons is natural persons, 
which is supplemented by artificial or fictitious persons such as 
corporations, partnerships, trusts and ships, that also have recog-
nized interests amounting to rights under the Americal legal sys-
tem. There are several aspects of the legal persons concept which 
are relevant to wildlife as potential legal persons. 
In the United States today, the status of being a natural legal 
person arises at birth, when full human rights simultaneously ac-
crue. 59 However, this consequence has not always been true. In the 
past, if a human was a Black, a woman or a child, he or she 
possessed no rights or fewer rights than white men.60 As American 
society matured, the circle of persons elevated to the status of legal 
[A]ll other Federal departments and agencies shall, in consultation with 
and with the assistance of the Secretary, utilize their authorities in further-
ance of the purpose of this chapter . . . by taking such action necessary to 
insure that actions authorized, funded, or carried out by them do not jeop-
ardize the continued existence of such endangered species and threatened 
species or result in the destruction or modification of habitat of such species. 
16 u.s.c. § 1536 (1976). 
58. 4 R. PoUND, supra note 47, § 124, at 192. 
59. 4 R. PoUND, supra note 47, § 127, at 384. In Floyd v. Anders, 440 F. Supp. 
535 (D.S.C. 1977), the court found that a doctor could not be held on a charge of 
murder for the abortion of a nonviable fetus, stating, "[i]ndeed the Supreme Court 
declared the fetus in the womb is neither alive nor a person within the meaning of 
the Fourteenth Amendment." See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
60. See generally Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 383 (1856) (status 
of Blacks under the Constitution); In re Goodell, 39 Wis. 232 (1875) (discussing why 
women were incapable of practicing law); Symposium: Women and the Law, a 
Retrospective View, 6 HUMAN RIGHTS 107-34 (1977). 
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persons was significantly enlarged. 81 This change resulted from the 
gradual enlightenment of the legal system regarding issues of race, 
sex and age. Today, the legal system accepts the premises that any 
human life should be respected to the fullest extent possible62 and 
that the mere fact of being a human person creates rights. It is now 
possible for the circle of recognized rights to expand further and 
bring wildlife within its confines. 
Although animals are denied rights in part upon the premise 
that only humans possess self-awareness, consciousness and the 
will to make choices, such distinctions should not preclude society 
from granting rights to wildlife. Assuming arguendo the validity of 
such distinctions, 63 the legal system nonetheless grants rights to 
humans who may lack self-awareness and the physical or mental 
ability for self-preservation (e.g., infants and the mentally re-
tarded). Accordingly, a distinction can be drawn between theca-
pacity for possessing legal rights, and the capacity for entering into 
legal transactions or possessing the power to exercise a particular 
right.64 The fact that infants and the mentally retarded are incapa-
61. Stone, supra note 4, at 454-57. As Professor Stone points out, Darwin had 
made note of his process in his writings. 
In Descent of Man, Darwin observes that the history of man's moral develop-
ment has been a continual extension in the objects of his "social instincts 
and sympathies." Originally each man had regard only for himself and those 
of a very narrow circle about him; later, he came to regard more and more 
"not only the welfare, but the happiness of all his fellow men"; then, "his 
sympathies became more tender and widely diffused, extending to men of 
all races, to the imbecile, maimed, and other useless mem hers of society, and 
finally to the lower animals . . . . " 
/d. at 450 (footnote omitted). 
62. In American jurisprudence the Declaration of Independence is often cited 
as an expression of those concerns which are most fundamental to the individual: 
"We hold these truths to be self evident, ... that among these are Life, Liberty, 
and the pursuit of Happiness." DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (1776) (emphasis 
added). More recently, a world-wide expression of the basic concerns of humans was 
drafted as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which the 
United States signed on Oct. 5, 1977. It states in part that "[e]very human being 
has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be 
arbitrarily deprived of his life." F. KIRGIS, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 976-77 
(1977). Most writers speak in terms ofsecurity of the individual. See E. BODENHEI· 
MER, JURISPRUDENCE 217, 236 (1974); R. POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY 
OF LAw 32 (1954); T. PAINE, CoMMON SENSE, in THE EssENTIAL THOMAS PAINE 26, 
(New American Library ed. 1969). 
63. Research work with chimpanzees has shown that they possess self-
awareness, which can be communicated even if not verbalized, as humans do. R. 
LEAKEY & R. LEVIN, ORIGINS 200 (1977) [hereinafter cited as LEAKEY]. 
64. 4 R. PoUND, supra note 47, § 125, at 276. 
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ble of recognizing or exercising their rights has not negated their 
ability to possess these rights. Rather, the legal system has made 
provisions for other capable individuals to represent the interests 
of those who cannot represent themselves. Indeed, even individu-
als without any handicap usually require legal counsel to exercise 
or protect their rights in the legal system. Thus, the mere fact that 
an animal cannot file a pleading or recognize the need to do so 
should not create a barrier to the determination of whether or not 
the animal can be the holder of legal rights. 
The determination of who or what shall be a legal person 
usually has been based on the moral perceptions of a given society. 
After appropriate self-reflection by its individual members, a so-
ciety arrives at a consensus that a particular group deserves certain 
legal rights.65 The decision of each society is reflected in its legal 
structure. In the United States, this judgment is reflected in the 
Constitution as amended by the people and as interpreted by the 
Supreme Court.66 No new process or test need be created in ad-
dressing the issue of wildlife rights. These rights can be determined 
by the same proc~ss that expanded the categories of natural per-
sons deserving of rights. 
By analogy to the rights of natural persons who lack capacity, 
there is no conceptual problem with wildlife possessing legal rights. 
The judgment and perceptions of society will ultimately be deter-
minative of this issue. Wildlife can become the holder of legal 
rights when humans come to recognize an inherent interest in wild-
life's possession of rights. 
C. The Present Legal Response to Wildlife Issues 
During the past ten years, many new laws87 have been enacted 
65. For a discussion of what constitutes appropriate self-reflection, see Perry, 
Moral and Judicial Rea.~oning, 22 BUFFALO L. REv. 769 (1973). 
66. Several amendments to the U.S. Constitution are examples of the changing 
moral perspective of U.S. citizens. The fourteenth amendment gave legal equality 
to Blacks. See THE FouRTEENTH AMENDMENT 14-38 (B. Schwartz ed. 1970); and H. 
MEYER, THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE 14TH AMENDMENT 125-49 (1977). The 
nineteenth amendment gave women the right to vote. See B. BABCOCK, A. FREED-
MAN, E. NoRTON & S. Ross, SEx DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAw 54 (1975). 
67. There have been laws passed that protect habitat: National Wildlife Re-
fuge System Administration Act of 1977, 16 U.S.C. §§ 668dd-ee (1976), and the 
WildemeBB Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1976); air: Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 
1857-1858a (1976); water quality: Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. 
§§ 1251-1376 (1976); and particular wildlife: Bald Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. 
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to address environmental concerns. Some of these new laws were 
intended to protect wildlife, but they failed to grant wildlife legal 
rights. On the state level, such enactments have been justified by 
an expanded concept of state police power.88 Likewise, the courts 
should be able to accommodate the new environmental laws by 
expanding the scope of the "community welfare" as a valid police 
power purpose. Although courts were unwilling at first, 69 most 
courts presently recognize that the protection of animals and eco-
systems is within the long-range welfare of the community.70 
On the federal level, the courts have justified the enactment 
of environmental protection laws on the basis of legislative powers 
granted by the Constitution.71 One could argue that these laws 
press the limits of the Constitution, but the federal judiciary has 
shown a strong willingness to support the new public concern for 
protection of the environment.72 The first federal enactment on 
§§ 668-668d (1976); Fur Seal Act of 1966, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1187 (1976); Marine 
Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1976); Wild Free-
Roaming Horses and Burros Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1976); Endangered Spec-
ies Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1976). For an analysis of the major themes 
of federal wildlife law, see M. BEAN, supra note 24, at 66-322. 
68. For discussions of state police power, see Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 
(1895) (regulation of taking of game birds); Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. 71 (1885) 
(regulation of the method of taking oysters); Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894) 
(regulation of the method of fishing). 
69. E.g., during the late 1960s and early 1970s many states and local govern-
ments sought to protect wetlands and marshes through regulatory legislation. Sev-
eral of these laws and ordinances were found to be an improper exercise of police 
power. See Bartlett v. Zoning Comm'n, 161 Conn. 24, 282 A.2d 907 (1971); State 
v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970); Morris County Land Improvement Co: v. 
Parsippany-Troy Hills Township, 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963). 
70. Most recent cases have found wetland statutes to be a proper exercise of 
the police power. See Potomac Sand and Gravel v. Mandel, 266 Md. 358, 293 A.2d 
241 (1972); Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972). Many 
states have also passed their own Endangered Species Acts. In upholding New 
York's Endangered Species Act, the New York Court of Appeals quoted a previous 
case, stating: '''The police power is not to be limited to guarding merely the physi-
cal or material interest of the citizen. His moral, intellectual and spiritual needs 
may also be considered. The eagle is preserved, not for its use but for its beauty.'" 
A.E. Nettleton Co. v. Diamond, 27 N.Y.2d 182, 192, 315 N.Y.S.2d 625, 632 (1970), 
quoting Barret v. State of New York, 220 N.Y. 423,428 (1917). See also Adams v. 
Shannon, 7 Cal. App. 3d 427, 86 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1970). 
71. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (commerce clause); U.S. CoNST. art. IV, § 3, 
cl. 2 (property clause) and U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (treaty power). 
72. Within the parameters of judicial discretion, many federal courts have 
taken innovative positions in support of environmental interests. See Stewart, 
Judicial Review of EPA Decisions, 62 IowA L. REv. 713, 717 (1977): "While judges 
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behalf of wildlife concerns was the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 
upheld as a legitimate exercise of the treaty power. In 1976 the 
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Wild Free-
Roaming Horses and Burros Actu under the property clause.75 The 
Court decided that the power "Congress has over public lands 
necessarily includes the power to regulate and protect the wildlife 
living there."76 The constitutionality of the Endangered Species 
Act and the Marine Mammal Protection Act has not been ques-
tioned yet, but congressional findings also suggest constitutional 
bases for both pieces of legislation. The Endangered Species Act 
is arguably based in part on the treaty power since it refers to the 
international treaty signed by the United States.77 The Marine 
Mammal Protection Act relies in some degree on both the treaty 
power and the commerce clause as justifications.78 
have accordingly declined to recognize a constitutional right to environmental qual-
ity, considerable evidence suggests that federal courts reviewing administrative 
action have accorded special protection to environmental statutory construction 
and the imposition of procedural safeguards." See also Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 
(5th Cir. 1970), cert denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971) (dredging permit denial); Sierra 
Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (standing issue); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating 
Comm. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971) 
(application of NEPAl. 
73. 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-711 (1976). See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
The Court found that the Act which regulated the taking of birds was justified 
under the U.S. Constituton as a proper exercise of the treaty power (art. II, § 2). 
The treaty in question was The Migratory Bird Convention, 39 Stat. 172 (1916). 
74. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1976). This Act protects horses and burros on 
public lands in the west. 
75. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976). 
76. 426 U.S. at 541. 
77. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(4) (1976). The treaty referred to is the International 
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, (1973] 27 U.S.T. 1087, 
T.I.A.S. No. 8249. 
78. The congressional finding states: 
(4) negotiations should be undertaken immediately to encourage the 
development of international arrangements for research on, and conservation 
of, all marine mammals; 
(5) marine mammals and marine mammal products either 
(A) move in interstate commerce, or 
(B) affect the balance of marine ecosystems in a manner which is 
important to other animals and animal products which move in inter-
state commerce, 
and that the protection and conservation of marine mammals is therefore 
necessary to insure the continuing availability ofthose products which move 
in interstate commerce . . 
16 u.s.c. § 1361(4) - (5) (1976). 
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As these examples illustrate, recent environmental laws and 
judicial decisions concerning those laws approach ecological issues 
from a human perspective. The legal system views the value of 
wildlife solely in terms of its relation to humans and ignores any 
independent value it manifests in the ecosystem.71 Through most 
of American history, the legal system has reflected the general view 
that wildlife are an economic resource that is worth protecting only 
to assure society that the "free" resource would always be available 
for exploitation.80 It was presumed that the only interest reflected 
in the legal system was the human one and that all values were 
derived from calculations concerning usefulness to humans. 81 It is 
now time to recognize that wildlife have their own interests82 and 
that they should have equal access to the legal system to protect 
and promote those interests. 
D. The Comparable Interest of Humans and Wildlife 
The biological ties and ecological relationship that exist be-
tween humans and wildlife are indicative of their commonality of 
79. Professor Tribe considered this a major problem in adequately dealing with 
environmental issues in general: 
A final obstacle remains. Policy analysts typically operate within a so-
cial, political and intellectual tradition that regards the satisfaction of indi-
vidual human wants as the only defensible measure of the good . . . This 
tradition is echoed as well in environmental legislation which protects nature 
not for its own sake but in order to preserve its potential value for man. 
Tribe, Ways Not to Think About Plastic Trees: New Foundations for Environmen-
tal Law, 83 YALE L.J. 1315, 1325 (1974). See Stone, supra note 4, at 489. 
80. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1895). "Indeed, the source of the police 
power as to game birds flows from the duty of the state to preserve for its people a 
valuable food supply." /d. at 534. 
81. See note 79 .~upra. 
82. Such a suggestion does not denigrate the efforts of wildlife protection to 
date. Consider the following historical example of a parallel problem. During the 
period of slavery in the United States, several states had laws that prohibited the 
killing of slaves. The premise for such legislation was not concern for the slaves 
themselves, but rather the idea that slaves represented valuable personal property 
and the statute was intended to protect this property interest. An Abolitionist 
would have also supported this legislation but for an entirely different reason. His 
support for such legislation would not be based on property law but upon the 
concept that all humans are equally deserving of the protection of the Jaw. This 
author finds himself in somewhat the same position as the Abolitionist. While most 
certainly supporting the efforts of most protective legislation, the support arises 
from a different premise. The legislation should be passed to acknowledge the 
interest of the wildlife and not just to further the economic and aesthetic interest 
of humans. 
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interests. As noted previously, 83 throughout recorded history West-
em society had believed that animals and humans were unrelated 
entities.84 It was not until Charles Darwin published his books, 
The Origin of Species85 and The Descent of Man, 86 that findings of 
science truly began to challenge those beliefs. Darwin concluded 
that from a biological perspective, the difference between humans 
and the rest of the animal world "certainly is one of degree and not 
one of kind."87 Darwin's theory has been substantiated further by 
recent studies of the hemoglobin molecule of humans and other 
animals; these studies have revealed a similarity in molecular 
structure that supports Darwin's theory of common ancestry.88 
83. See notes 12-39 supra and accompanying text. 
84. Consider the following summary of historical attitudes toward animals: 
The ancient Greek Philosophers assumed that the world was serenely 
fixed and unchanging . . . . 
In the Middle Ages people believed that the world was created for the 
sake of man. In the Renaissance Copernicus, Galileo, Kepler, Newton, and 
others discovered the immensity of the universe, and man appeared to recede 
in importance in the cosmos .... 
In Linnaeus's time [1735-1766) every existing species was regarded as 
separately created, and in about the same condition in which we observe it 
now. Nevertheless, in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, biolo-
gists such as Buffon, Tyson, Camper, and Cuvier could not fail to be im-
pressed by implications of finding more and more basic similarities between 
human and animal bodies. And among animals, apes and monkeys resemble 
us most. 
T. DOBZHANSKY, S. AYALA, G. STEBBINS & J. VALENTINE, EvournoN 438-39 (1977) 
[hereinafter cited as DoBZHANSKY). 
85. c. DARWIN, THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES (1859). 
86. C. DARWIN, THE DESCENT OF MAN (1871). 
87. /d. at 193. For an excellent summary of current scientific understandings 
of the history of homo sapiens, see the book ORIGINS, which states that 
"[u)nquestionably we are part of the animal kingdom." LEAKEY, supra note 63, at 
10. 
88. Hemoglobin is a complex molecule in the blood that carries the oxygen 
from the lungs to cells throughout the body. The hemoglobin molecule is composed 
of subunits called amino acids. The alpha chain in the human hemoglobin has 141 
amino acids and the beta chain has 146 amino acids. The hemoglobin of the chim-
panzee is identical with that of the human. The hemoglobin of a gorilla is identical 
to that of the human, with only one amino acid substitution in the alpha chain. 
The mouse would be the same but for 19 differences, and the rabbit would be the 
same but for 28 differences. Apparently all vertebrates of the animal world use this 
same basic mechanism for transporting oxygen to the cells of the body. See 
DoBZHANSKY, supra note 84, at 444-45. See also V. GRANT, ORGANISMIC EvoumoN 
278 (1977). 
This resemblance does not negate the existence of differences between humans 
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The ties between humans and animals are strikingly apparent 
at the most fundamental biological level. Deoxyribonucleic acid 
(DNA) is the ultimate common denominator among all living 
things. It is a double-helical molecule composed of four different 
units or groupings of atoms called nucleotides. The nucleotides 
function as a genetic alphabet by communicating the information 
necessary to reproduce the earth's multitude of organisms. This is 
the most basic information of life itself and all organisms, from 
bacteria to humans, use this same alphabet to recreate their spec-
ies. The only difference between the DNA of humans and that of 
a snail or an eagle is the length and order of the units of the DNA 
molecule. As an organism becomes more complex, more informa-
tion is necessary for its recreation each generation. At its most 
elemental level, the evolution of humans is the evolution of a more 
lengthy DNA molecule.89 
Not only do men and animals share a common form of biologi-
cal communication, but because they evolved from a common an-
cestry, they also share the same biological mechanisms. Humans 
and animals have the same vital organs, although they exhibit 
different levels of sophistication.110 The higher orders of the animal 
kingdom also possess the same five senses as humans; indeed, 
some members of the kingdom have more highly developed senses 
than humans.91 
The one area in which humans have a distinct physiological 
advantage over other animals is in the development of the brain. 
The human brain is not totally different from the brains of other 
animals; the hind brain, the cerebellum and the forebrain, which 
developed early in the evolutionary process, are found in other 
animals and are still present in the human brain. However, it was 
from these more ancient parts of the human brain that the neocor-
tex evolved, whch gives humans their unique capabilities of com-
and the remainder of the animal world but demonstrates that the similarities are 
more striking than the differences. 
89. See DoszHANSKY, supra note 84, at 20. See generally 237 SciENTIFIC AM., 
July 1977 at 22; L. CUDMORE, THE CENTER OF LIFE 89-109 (1977); R. DAWKINS, THE 
SELFISH GENE 22-48 (1976). 
90. For a discussion of comparative anatomy, see DARWIN READER 264-66 
(Bates & Humphrey ed. 1956); T. DoBZHANSKY, MANKIND EvoLVING 171-74 (1962). 
91. The eagle can see farther and sharper; the bat and the dolphin can use 
sonar to determine distances; the bloodhound can smell better; and many animals 
have a more highly developed sense of hearing. 
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munication, organization and abstract thinking.92 With the excep-
tion of the human neocortex, which has been responsible for the 
development of a complex society and technology, the commonal-
ity between humans and other animals is overwhelming. 
In addition to the biological ties between humans and ani-
mals, the ecosystem itself is suggestive of other fundamental links. 
The term "web of life" describes the ecosystem. 93 Notwithstanding 
human inability to communicate with other animals,94 humans 
and animals are fellow-beings who depend equally on the same air 
and water and other necessities of life. Each human and animal 
eventually dies, and its atoms return to the ecosystem from which 
its life and energy was drawn. The atoms which comprise the mus-
cles, blood or brain of a human, at one time might have been at 
the bottom of the ocean, in the feather of a bird or part of a tre.e. 
92. For a fuller discussion of the development of the human mind and its 
comparison to nonhuman mind!!, see LEAKEY, supra note 63, at 179-205; C. SAGAN, 
THE DRAGONS OF EDEN 51-83 (1977). Recent research suggests that a structure for 
the nerve cells in the cortex has been discovered: 
[T]he cortex is made up of a mosaic of modular elements: vertical 
columns of inter-connected nerve cells oriented perpendicularly to the cor-
tical surface . . . . 
The modular architecture of the cortex is remarkably similar in diverse 
mammalian species, ranging from rats to monkeys, suggesting that the dra-
matic increase in behavioral capabilities as one ascends the evolutionary tree 
is due not to change in the internal structure of the modules but rather to 
an increase in their number. Extrapolating to man, it appears that the excep-
tional qualities of the human brain rest primarily in a quantitative improve-
ment rather than a qualitative one: the number of cortical modules in the 
human cortex is at least several times greater than that of apes and much 
greater than that of other mammalian species. 
239 SciENTIFic AM., Sept. 1978, at 97. 
93. One author has described the interrelationships of the web of life: 
You see in this beauty a dynamic stabilizing effect essential to all life. Its 
aim is simple: to maintain and produce coordinated patterns of greater and 
grP.ater diversity. Life improves the closed system's capacity to sustain life. 
Life-all life-is in the service of life. Necessary nutrients are made available 
to life in greater and greater richness as the diversity of life increases. The 
entire landscape comes alive, filled with relationships and relationships 
within relationships. 
F. HERBERT, DuNE 505 (appendix 1) (1965). 
94. Some would argue that this statement is no longer correct due to break-
throughs in attempts to communicate with higher order mammals like gorillas, 
chimpanzees and dolphins. See D. RUMBAUGH, Land [chimpanzee] Learning Lan-
guage: A Progress Report, BRAIN AND LANGUAGE 205-12 (vol. 1(2) 1974). See gener-
ally E. HAHN, LooK WHo's TALKING (1978); F. DAVIS, ELOQUENT ANIMALS (1978). 
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One manifestation of the mutual dependence of all living 
things in the "web of life" is the concept of elemental cycles. 05 The 
oxygen cycle is a prime example of an elemental cycle. Oxygen 
originates from the decomposition of water molecules by light en-
ergy in plant photosynthesis. Carbon dioxide, on the other hand, 
which is partially derived from animal respiration, enables plants 
to convert water into an organic molecule and provides the oxygen 
atoms for the organic molecule which is produced by plant photo-
synthesis and which constitutes the fundamental unit of biochemi-
cal energy.96 Thus, a disruption of one part of the cycle will have 
an impact on other segments of the cycle.97 In addition to elemen-
tal cycles, weather cycles and water cycles also are interrelated 
with each other, and with plants and animals. Despite enormous 
technological advances, humans and animals are dependent upon 
these cycles. 
Another fundamental element of the ecosystem is the food 
chain. Every living thing is a potential food source for other living 
things, and each animal's body requires food for energy and sur-
vival.D8 Since only plants can derive energy directly from the sun, 
killing for food is an integral part of the ecosystem because an 
animal or plant must die in order for another animal to continue 
living. The food chain is further evidence of commonality of inter-
ests between humans and animals since each organism is depen-
dent on those nearer the beginning of the chain for the transfer of 
food energy. 99 
95. An elemental cycle is the use and re·use of a particular element starting 
with the element in its free state (e.g., N;, 0,; Fe) and its conversion into more 
complex chemical compounds through biochemical processes. Following biochemi-
cal absorption by living organisms such compounds break down and by either death 
or elimination, the element is removed from the organism, subjected to further 
biochemical reactions, and released, ready to start its cycle anew. See generally, 
E. 0DUM, FUNDAMENTALS OF ECOLOGY 86-92 (3d ed. 1971). 
96. P. CLOUD & A. GmoR, The Oxygen Cycle, in THE BIOSPHERE 59-61 (Scien-
tific American 1970). 
A representative chemical equation for the conversion of oxygen to carbon 
dioxide and back to oxygen would be: 
C,H,O, (sugar) + 60,-6CO, + 6H,O + energy (animal respiration) 6CO, 
+ 6H,O + sunlight.,......C,H,O, + 60, (plant photosynthesis). 
See generally E.D.P. DERoBERTS, W. NowiNSKI & F. SAEZ, CELL BIOLOGY 244-
46 (5th ed. 1970). 
97. See P. CoLINVAUX, INTRODUCTION TO EcoLOGY 197-228 (1972); T. EMMEL, 
ECOLOGY & POPULATION BIOLOGY 12 (1973). 
98. See P. CoLINVAUX, supra note 97, at 145-80; T. EMMEL, supra note 97, at 
24-37. 
99. E. 0DUM, supra note 95, at 63. 
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The relative stability of the earth's ecosystem is derived from 
the interplay of energy transfers and the elemental cycles. These 
control mechanisms provide the homeostatic environment which 
all life has adapted to and is dependent on. 100 Although man has 
erected many physical barriers between himself and the environ-
ment, man's survival is inextricably dependent upon the environ-
ment for food, air and water. As man destroys wildlife and its 
habitats, parts of the web of life are destroyed; if a sufficient· 
amount of the web is destroyed, the ecosystem could be seriously 
endangered. 101 
100. Id. at 35. 
101. One might argue that since humans are part of the ecosystem, all human 
activities, including the negative impacts, must be part of nature's plan. This logic 
compels the conclusion that the killing of wildlife, or even an entire species, is part 
of the "natural" process and therefore is of no particular consequence. This reason· 
ing is faulty, however, when the rate of change is considered from an evolutionary 
perspective. The House Report on the Endangered Species Act of 1973 noted: 
Throughout the history of the world, as we know it, species of animals 
and plants have appeared, changed, and disappeared. The disappearance of 
a species is by no means a current phenomenon, nor is it an occasion for 
terror or panic. · 
It is however, at the same time an occasion for caution, for self-searching 
and for understanding. Man's presence on the Earth is relatively recent, and 
his effective domination over the world's life support systems has taken place 
within a few short generations. Our ability to destroy, or almost destroy, all 
intelligent life on the planet became apparent only in this generation. A 
certain humility, and a sense of urgency, seem indicated. 
From all evidence available to us, it appears that the pace of disappear-
ance of species is accelerating. As we homogenize the habitats in which these 
plants and animals evolved, and as we increase the pressure for products that 
they are in a position to supply (usually unwillingly) we threaten their-and 
our own-genetic heritage. 
H.R. REP. No. 412, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1973). See 114 SCIENCE NEws 233 (1978). 
Consider the consequences to the human body if the rate of cell reproduction 
of any individual cell varies from the normal rate. The body is like a small ecosys-
tem which derives its energy from food rather than sunlight. The body is made up 
of many types of cells, all of which perform various functions. Apparently, with 
certain exceptions, throughout most of the human life, new cells are formed as 
needed by the division of existing cells. If, for some reason, one of the cells in the 
body starts to reproduce at a significantly higher rate than its neighbors, the pathol-
ogical condition known as cancer arises. If the rate of cell growth is not returned to 
normal (by removal or treatment) then the entire body will die because, as a self-
cpntained entity, it is unable to adjust to the unnatural rate of growth of a small 
portion of itself. 
The impact of human activities on the earth in many ways is analogous to the 
impact of cancer on the human body. The similar acceleration in the rate of change 
or growth is unnatural in the normal evolution of ecosystems. New chemicals are 
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E. Recognition of Wildlife's Interest 
Arguably, a major stumbling block to recognizing wildlife 
rights is the problem of how humans can presume to know animals' 
best interests when animals cannot communicate with humans. 
With the possible exception of the most intelligent animals, it may 
be questionable whether humans can ever truly know what a par-
ticular animal or species desires or needs. However, the presump-
tion that certain interests are so fundamental that all humans 
should be accorded legal rights to protect these interests, whether 
or not they individually ask for them, 102 should be extended to 
wildlife. As humans have both a self-interest and a moral obliga-
tion to recognize the rights of other human beings, they have an 
equivalent interest and obligation to recognize the interests of 
wildlife since the stability and integrity of the ecosystem is at 
stake. Moreover, the moral burden demanding this recognition is 
particularly great when human activities cause serious intrusions 
upon the interests of the wildlife community. Given the reasonable 
presumption that humans should recognize the fundamental inter-
ests of wildlife, important questions remain: What are wildlife's 
interests? What rights should wildlife be accorded? After these 
rights are granted, how will conflicts between human rights and 
wildlife rights be resolved? 
III. WILDLIFE RIGHTS 
A. Property Interest 
One of the foundation stones upon which western legal sys-
tems are built is the concept of property ownership by individual 
human beings and other recognized legal persons. There is a wide 
range of theories purporting to trace and explain the concept of 
private ownership of property. 103 However, humans have not al-
constantly being added to the air and water, land is being cleared of its natural 
vegetation, and wildlife species are being eliminated at a rate much faster than 
natural history would suggest. It is questionable whether the ecosystem can adjust 
to these sudden changes and whether the various cycles in the ecosystem can 
continue to perform their functions of sustaining life on this planet. 
102. A partial list of the rights found in the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights includes (A) the inherent right to life (art. 6); (B) the right to 
liberty and security of the person (art. 9); and (C) the right to liberty of movement 
and freedom to choose a residence (art. 12). F. KIRGIS, supra note 62, at 976-77. 
103. Professor Cribbet mentions the occupation theory, the natural rights 
theory, the labor theory, the legal theory and the social utility theory. J. CRIBBET, 
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 6 (1975). See generally ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS 
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ways made property claims of a private nature. Although man has 
shared the earth with animals for perhaps three billion years, the 
concept of private property only arose subsequent to the agricul-
tural revolution ten thousand years ago. 104 
The use of land is as important to wildlife as it is to humans. 
Since wildlife have an inherent interest in survival; they require 
enough land to effectuate that interest. 105 Wildlife need land to find 
food, to mate and to engage in those activities that are peculiar to 
each species. There are three possible approaches that the legal 
system could use to protect wildlife's interests in land: (1) allow 
wildlife to possess title to land, (2) impose limitations upon the 
property rights of legal persons or (3) hold certain lands for the 
benefit of wildlife. While the first alternative would be extremely 
difficult to implement, either the second or third alternatives could 
amply protect wildlife interests. 
The property rights accompanying land ownership allow a 
property owner to ignore the needs of any wildlife located on it. 108 
Indeed, unless precluded by game regulations or special federal 
laws, the owner of land may kill any wildlife found on his property. 
If the interests of wildlife are to be protected, the "bundle of 
rights" deemed to inhere in property ownership must be modified. 
The liberty of a human to use the property or change its form 
should be allowed only to the extent that the proposed use or 
change will not unreasonably or unnecessarily interfere with the 
local ecosystem and its wildlife. This restriction would be compa-
rable to the requirement imposed by several states when the eco-
OF PROPERTY LAW (B. Ackerman ed. 1975); 3 R. PouND, JuRISPRUDENCE§ 86, at 105; 
PATON & DERHAM, supra note 47, § 119, at 538; G. THOMPSON, 1 REAL PROPERTY 1-4 
(1924). 
104. LEAKEY, supra note 63, at 119-45, 176-77. 
105. Air and water are also included in the term "land." Flying animals need 
enough air as part of their territory; aquatic animals need enough water. 
106. Dean Pound lists six basic rights that are included within the concept of 
ownership of real property: 
(1) jus posidendi, the right to have and get possession; 
(2) jus prohibendi or excludendi, the right to prevent interference by oth-
ers. 
(3) jus disponendi, the power of alienating to others; 
(4) jus utendi, the liberty of using the object according to the owner's will; 
(5) jus fruendi, the liberty of enjoying the fruits of the property; and 
(6) jus abutendi, the liberty of changing its form or even destroying it. 
5 R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE § 133, at 128. 
HeinOnline -- 9 Envtl. L.  267 1978-1979
1979] WILDLIFE RIGHTS 267 
system in question is a wetlands or a marsh. 107 Accordingly, where 
an area is of prime importance to the ecosystem, wildlife and habi-
tat preservation would take priority over man's unrestricted use108 
and neither humans nor animals could claim absolute rights rela-
tive to land. 
The proper focus of concern should be the ecosystem rather 
than a particular bird or mammal because many animals are tran-
sient, and proof of interference with a particular animal on a given 
piece of land may be impossible. The ecosystem itself is always 
present and is the best measure of the actual and potential pres-
ence of the animal kingdom; as the common denominator, it is the 
best measuring device of the potential interference with the inter-
ests of wildlife. In addition, not all wildlife are found in all places, 
so the best measure of which wildlife have an interest in a particu-
lar geographic location is the natural ecosystem at that location. 
Presumably, an administrative permit-granting process would 
be used to give a full public review of proposed human activities 
that would affect wildlife. Prior to reaching a decision, the admin-
istrative hearings officer would need to determine the nature of the 
proposed project, its potential disruption to the locality and the 
ecological value of the area that would be disrupted. Ecological 
value could be measured in terms of the worth of a healthy and 
balanced ecosystem that could support the native wildlife. 
Recent breakthroughs in man's understanding of ecosystems 
can aid in identifying the ecological value of a particular piece of 
property. This valuation of ecosystems has already been done for 
Virginia's coastal wetlands. In 1972, the Commonwealth of Vir-
ginia passed a Wetlands Act108 which required a permit for any 
activity that would disrupt a wetlands area. 110 The Act required the 
administrative decisionmaker to assess every permit application 
by the same primary standard: "[ w]etlands of primary ecological 
107. See text accompanying notes 109-12 infra. 
108. In Turner v. County of Del Norte, 24 Cal. App. 2d 3ll, 101 Cal. Rptr. 93 
(1972), a California Court of Appeals upheld a local ordinance that prohibited the 
development of plaintiffs' land because of its location in a flood plain. See Turnpike 
Realty v. Town of Dedham, 284 N .E.2d 891 (Mass. 1972) (protection of flood plain); 
Speigle v. Beach Haven, 46 N.J. 479, 218 A.2d 129 (1966) (protection of beach); 
Potomac Sand and Gravel v. Mandel, 266 Md. 358, 293 A.2d 241 (preservation of 
wetlands); and Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (preserva-
tion of wetlands). 
109. VA. ConE §§ 62.1-13.1 to 13.20 (Supp. 1978). 
110. VA. CpoE § 62.1-13.3 (Supp. 1978). 
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significance shall not be altered so that the ecological systems in 
the wetlands are unreasonably disturbed .... " 111 The Virginia 
Institute of Marine Science was charged with the responsibility of 
scientifically evaluating wetlands. 112 
The Institute's first report addressed the biological impacts on 
wetlands of various human activities, such as dredging, building a 
pier or constructing a bulkhead. 113 It also described many of the 
marsh plants, explained the role they played in the ecosystem114 
· and determined that wetlands could be broken down into twelve 
different types of plant communities. In a later report, the Insti-
tute discussed the twelve types of marshes. The report included a 
scientific evaluation of each type of marsh and rated the types in 
terms of which were the most valuable to wetlands' ecosystems. 115 
Scientific studies like those used to implement Virginia's Wet-
lands Act could be done for all types of ecosystems. The proposal 
that the welfare of the ecosystem should impose appropriate limits 
on property rights will require long-range planning of resource and 
land uses and a detailed scientific appraisal of how various types 
of land uses interact with ecosystems. By condensing scientific 
knowledge into a systematic framework, the administrative deci-
sionmaker will have an objective basis for judging the value to 
wildlife of particular parcels of land and limiting humans' land use 
accordingly. 
Man and wildlife often can use the same land without con-
flicts, but there are three situations where conflicts will have to be 
111. VA. CoDE § 62.1-13.3 (Supp. 1978). 
112. VA. CoDE § 62.1-13.4 (Supp. 1978). 
113. L. Marcellus, G. Dawes & G. Silberhom, Local Management of Wet-
lands-Environmental Considerations, 10-21 (Special Report No. 35, Virginia Insti-
tute of Marine Science) (1973). 
114. !d. at 47-79. E.g., under its listing, cattails' habitats are "freshwater 
marshes and upland margins of brackish or low saline marshes;" cattail production 
is "3-4 tons per acre annually;" and associated animal species are muskrats and 
geese, who eat cattail root stocks, and marsh birds, especially redwing blackbirds, 
for whom cattails provide a nesting habitat. !d. at 67. 
115. G. Silber horn, G. Dawes & T. Barnard, Guidelines for Activities Affecting 
Virginia Wetlands, (Special Report No. 46, Virginia Institute of Marine Science) 
(1974). The categories used to evaluate each plant community include dominant 
vegetation, growth, habit, average density, annual production (i.e., food available 
for the food chain), water fowl and wildlife utility, water quality control and flood 
buffer. The type I salt marsh cordgrass community is listed among the most impor-
tant; "[c]onsidering the many attributes of this type of marsh community, its 
conservation should be of highest priority." Id. at 6. 
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resolved. First, particular species, such as the desert bighorn sheep 
of the western United States, cannot coexist with humans and 
their activities. 118 Second, the supporting ecosystems of certain 
species cannot coexist with the economic development of humans. 
For example, crabs, oysters and fish can coexist with human activ-
ity, but the marshes and wetlands upon which they depend for food 
and shelter cannot support any human development and must 
remain in their natural states. 117 Third, certain endangered or 
threatened species cannot survive unless humans refrain from in-
terfering with their habitats. 
In the first area of conflict, where a particular species cannot 
coexist with humans, the only realistic solution is to set aside the 
acreage necessary to support their survivaL Much of the critical 
land already is owned by the United States. 118 Moreover, the fed-
eral government and some states have shown a willingness to set 
aside large tracts of land for the benefit of wildlife. Yellowstone 
National Park was the first example of .a substantial amount of 
land preserved in its natural state. 118 Many private organizations 
are also working toward the goal of preserving land in its natural 
state. For example, the Nature·Conservancy recently completed a 
transaction that will preserve twenty-six square miles of land in 
the Santa Rosa Mountains of southern California for the benefit 
of the desert bighorn sheep. In 1977, the same organization ac-
quired an option on 6,029 acres of land which are part of the critical 
habitat of the endangered Mississippi sand~ill crane.l20 
The clearest example of the second area of conflict, where the 
animals' supporting ecosystem is unable to withstand human in-
terference is the coastal marshes or wetlands. Only during the past 
twenty years has the ecological value of these areas become appar-
ent to scientists. 121 Many states have enacted laws restricting the 
116. See note 124, infra. 
117. See E. OouM, supra note 95, at 345-60 for a d.escription of the sensitivity 
of estuary ecosystems. 
118. Nearly one third of the total land area of the United States is federally 
owned. M. BEAN, supra note 24, at 126. 
119. Established by 17 Stat. 32 (1872) (presently 16 U.S.C. § 21 (1976)). See 
J. TREFETHEN, supra note 33, at 76-90. 
120. Byers, Let Them Live, the Nature Conservancy News, Fall 1977 at 8. 
121. See, e.g., M. Wass & T. Wright, Coastal Wetlands of Virginia (1969), 
Special Report No. 10, Virginia Institute of Marine Science; J. TEAL & M. TEAL, 
LIFE AND DEATH OF THE SALT MARSH (1969). 
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use of privately owned wetlands.122 While some of the first attempts 
were rejected by the courts as unconstitutional takings, most 
courts now consider the infringement of private property rights to 
protect wildlife and their habitats as within the states' police 
power.l23 
In the third category of conflict, where species are endangered 
or threatened, a partial solution is already available in the Endan-
gered Species Act of 1973.124 Man's destruction of animal habitats 
is one of the principal reasons why an individual species is listed 
on the endangered species list. Accordingly, section 7 of the Act125 
requires that all federal agencies cease any activity which will 
destroy or modify the critical habitat of any endangered or threat-
ened species. 128 
The U.S. Supreme Court recently adjudicated a conflict be-
tween a species habitat and human activity in Tennessee Valley 
Authority v. Hill. 121 The Tennessee Valley Authority wished to 
dam up a portion of the Little Tennessee River. However, the 
Secretary of the Interior determined that a portion of the area that 
would be flooded by the dam was a critical habitat for the snail 
darter, 128 a small fish which was listed by the Secretary as endan-
gered.129 The Secretary then determined that, under section 7 of 
the Endangered Species Act, 130 the construction of the dam must 
stop. This determination resulted in a direct confrontation be-
tween an agency that had already expended approximately $80 
million and a three-inch fish faced with extinction. 131 The Court, 
122. See Note, State and Local Wetland Regulation: The Problem of Taking 
Without Just Compensation, 58 VA. L. REv. 876 (1972); Note, Wetland Fill Restric-
tions Do Not Constitute a Compensable "Taking" Within the Meaning of the Fifth 
Amendment, 4 SETON HALL L. REv. 662 (1972); and F. BossELMAN, THE TAKING 
IssuE 155-63 (1973). 
123. See Potomac Sand and Gravel v. Mandel, 266 Md. 358, 293 A.2d 241 
(upholding a wetlands statute); Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 
761 (upholding a wetlands statute); and A.E. Nettleton Co. v. Diamond, 27 N.Y.2d 
182, 315 N .Y.S.2d 625 (upholding New York's Endangered Species Act). 
124. 16 u.s.c. §§ 1531-1543 (1976). 
125. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1976), quoted in note 57, supra. 
126. "The two major causes of extinction are hunting and destruction of natu-
ral habitat." S. REP. No. 307, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in [1973] U.S. CoDE 
CoNG. & AD. NEws 2989, 2990. 
127. _U.S.-· 98 S. Ct. 22.79 (1978). 
128. 50 C.F.R. § 17.95(e) (1977). 
129. 50 C.F.R. § 17.11(i) (1977). 
130. 16 u.s.c. § 1536 (1976) 
131. T.V.A. v. Hill, 98 S. Ct. at 2283-91. 
HeinOnline -- 9 Envtl. L.  271 1978-1979
1979] WILDLIFE RIGHTS 271 
in a six to three decision, upheld the injunction forbidding comple-
tion of the dam, stating that "Congress has spoken in the plainest 
of words, making it abundantly clear that the balance has been 
struck in favor of affording endangered species the highest of pri-
orities, thereby adopting a policy which is described as 'institu-
tionalized caution.' " 132 Thus, the habitat needs of an endan-
gered species were held paramount to a proposed human develop-
ment which would be directly at odds with those needs. This 
result also could have been reached by applying this Article's pro-
posed modification of property rights: if a human land use would 
destroy an ecosystem essential to the snail darter's survival, the 
human land use should be prohibited. 
The major drawback to the present federal endangered species 
legislation is that it only protects critical land habitats where the 
land is owned by the federal government or where the proposed 
activity requires federal approval. Because federal laws do not pro-
tect critical wildlife habitats owned by private individuals, there 
is a need for additional legislation in this area. 
A major habitat issue presently before Congress concerns 
Alaska. During 1979 Congress must determine the legal status of 
100 million acres of federal land in Alaska. 133 This situation pres-
ents an opportunity to preserve large tracts of wildlife habitats at 
minimal expense. Congress must decide to what degree, if any, 
human development and resource exploitation will be allowed in 
the subject tracts of Alaskan land. The extent that a proposed 
economic use, such as mining or timber cutting, conflicts with the 
needs and interests of the existing wildlife and the supporting eco-
system should be carefully weighed. However, wildlife may not 
have sufficient habitat reserved for their use in Alaska since they 
have no right to habitat. At present, wildlife are dependent on the 
political power of various national environmental citizens' groups 
who seek to preserve their habitats. 134 
Thus, there is a need for legislation that will recognize the 
interests of wildlife in public and private land use decisions. This 
132. /d. at 2302. 
133. H.R. 39, 95th Cong.,1st Sess., 123 CONG. REc. 79 (1977). The bill passed 
the House by a 277 to 31 vote on May 19, 1978. 124 CoNG. REc. 4329 (1978). The 
Senate, however, rejected the bill during the close of the 1977 session. 
134. As of July 1978, a partial list of the Alaska Coalition's member organiza-
tions included Defenders of Wildlife, Environmental Defense Fund, Friends of the 
Earth, National Audubon Society, Sierra Club and The Wilderness Society. 
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could be accomplished with a broadly worded statute covering a 
multitude of potential situations. An example of such an act, 
which with minor changes would allow wildlife interests to be rep-
resented, is the Michigan Environmental Protection Act of 1970.135 
This Act allows any individual to bring an action when it is be-
lieved that the conduct of a particular "defendant has, or is 
likely to pollute, impair or destroy the air, water or other natural 
resources or the public trust therein .... " 138 Judges are granted 
broad discretion under this law to effectuate a variety of remedies, 
including temporary and permanent equitable relief or the imposi-
tion of conditions on the defendant. 137 This law requires one basic 
addition to insure that the interests of wildlife will be protected: a 
person may bring a suit when the actions of another would unrea-
sonably or unnecessarily interfere with the habitat of wildlife. 138 
Finally, the other legislative approach to protecting the inter-
ests of wildlife would be the permit process used in wetlands pres-
ervation}39 Under this system, a permit would be required for any 
land use likely to be adverse to natural ecosystems and wildlife. 
Thus, either this permit system or the modified Michigan Environ-
mental Protection Act would redefine property rights to preserve 
wildlife and their essential habitats. 
B. Individual Rights. 
The suggestion that an individual animal could have legal 
rights would apparently contradict Western cultural history. To be 
sure, the notion that an animal is no different from a tree or an 
iron ore deposit that exists for human exploitation is longstanding 
in the Western tradition. 140 Therefore, accepting the proposition 
that individual animals should have legal rights would require a 
difficult intellectual and cultural transition. Yet the possibilities 
135. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 699.1201-699.1207 (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 
14.528(201)-14.528(207)(Callaghan 1976) ). 
136. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 691.1203 (MicH. STAT. ANN. § 14.528 (203)(Cal-
laghan 1976)). 
137. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 691.1204(1) (MICH. STAT. ANN~ § 
14.528(204)(1)(Callaghan 1976)). 
138. Such broad language is unlikely to generate frivolous or burdensome num-
bers of lawsuits. See Sax & Conner, Michigan's Environmental Protection Act of 
1970: A Progress Report, 70 MICH. L. REv. 1003 (1972), which finds that such broad 
language has not resulted in a flood of unnecessary litigation. 
139. See note 109 supra. 
140. See notes 12, 22, 27 and 45 supra and accompanying text. 
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for recognizing animals' legal rights are a function of how humans 
perceive animals' interests. 
Most authors who have considered the rights of individual 
animals agree that the unnecessary suffering that man inflicts on 
animals should be eliminated.••• While this approach has merit, it 
is not the one suggested here. Instead, the natural ecosystem pro-
vides the basis from which the rights of wildlife can be derived; 
hence, the focus of this article is "wildlife rights" and not "animal 
rights." Domestic animals such as cats and dogs, and animals bred 
for human purposes, such as cattle and sheep, are not wildlife in 
the ecological sense nor are they part of the natural ecosystem. 
This is not to say that animals other than wildlife should not 
receive concern and protection; rather, their rights will have to be 
derived from an analytical basis other than the ecosystem. 
What rights should be allocated to wildlife? Should they have 
the right to vote or the right to trial by a jury of their peers? 
Obviously, these rights make no sense since man and animals are 
unable to communicate. Moreover, such rights are not essential to 
protect wildlife's interest in living a natural life. In determining 
which rights should be granted, the natural ecosystem serves as the 
touchstone: the proper focus is the physical world of wildlife and 
ecosystems rather than the subjective and nonscientific morass of 
moral attitudes and religious precepts. 
Since the most critical concern for any living being is its con-
tinued physical existence, 142 this interest must be articulated as a 
right within the human legal system. Since human interference 
poses a serious threat to the survival of wildlife, the legal system 
must place appropriate limitations on human actions. Wildlife's 
right to survival would require that criminal and civil liability be 
imposed on humans violating this right. Certainly, the laws which 
restrain the government and individual humans from intentionally 
141. See J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND 
LEGISLATION 311 (1907); and T. REGAN & P. SINGER; supra note 22, at 190, 197. 
142. Again, the issue arises whether humans can speak for wildlife. Since it is 
presumed that humans prefer life to death, the same premise can reasonably be 
applied to animals even though the interest of a particular animal may never be 
known. There is no scientific evidence of animal behavior suggesting that wildlife 
do not prefer life to death. There is scientific evidence, however, of animals showing 
the same responses to potentially dangerous situations in an effort to preserve 
themselves and their families. See note 102 supra and accompanying text. 
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harming a particular human 143 could be expanded to protect the 
personal security of wildlife. But the legal system would also gener-
ate defenses for alleged human violators, which perhaps would 
parallel modern tort law. Thus, the guarantee of wildlife's security 
will be no more absolute than that of humans' .'44 
There are three potential exceptions to wildlife's right to 
personal security and the rule of noninterference by humans: 
(1) the conflict with individual human survival; (2) the problem 
of humans acting as substitute predators; and (3) the problem of 
providing protein for the human population with respect to the 
concept of sustained yield. The first exception would permit a 
consumer-hunter to kill wildlife in order to sustain his own life, 
for humans should be allowed to pursue their own self-interest 
when there is an issue of personal survival. 145 Thus, the killing of 
wildlife to provide feathers for hats or skins for coats would .not · 
be included in this exception. 
The second potential exception concerns another category of 
hunter, the sport hunter. For example, deer hunting is justified by 
some hunters on the basis that humans merely serve as substitute 
predators who control the deer's population levels. However, the 
intervention of sport hunters has disturbed the normal predator-
prey relationships.'48 Moreover, many states have implemented 
wildlife "management" programs to increase the population levels 
of desirable species such as deer .147 If the dignity and interests of 
individual animals are to be truly recognized, sport hunting must 
not be allowed to continue. 148 To be sure, an abrupt halt to deer 
143. However, the government may demand a person's participation in war, 
some states permit a person to be executed for the commission of certain crimes, 
and in situations such as self defense the intentional killing of humans is justified: 
144. If animals are granted rights, it follows that the legal system could impose 
certain obligations on them as well. Any legal person capable of bringing suit is also 
subject to being sued by others. It may be possible to satisfy a judgment against 
an animal through a fund of money or other assets that have accumulated by virtue 
of their previous successful actions. However, defining these rights and obligations 
would require more extensive treatment than the scope of this Article entails. See 
Stone·, supra note 4. 
145. While it is doubtful that killing could be justified based on human cul-
tural traditions, it is likely that killing to defend humans and their property could 
be justified. 
146. M. FROME, BAITLE FOR THE WILDERNESS 72-75 (1974). 
147. J. TREFETHEN, supra note 33, at 245-47. 
148. Historically, hunters have played a role in the concern and protection of 
wildlife at a time when very few cared. These prior good deeds, however, cannot 
justify the continuation of hunting in light of new scientific and social concern. 
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hunting could have adverse consequences for both humans and 
deer. A deer population unchecked by the annual rite of hunting 
would create a short-term population explosion that would be de-
structive to agricultural interests. In addition, when the deer's food 
supply was diminished, many deer would become undernourished 
and susceptible to disease and adverse weather. Thus, while sport 
hunting should be stopped to insure wildlife's right to survive, 
temporary human intervention might be required to allow a natu-
ral balance to reestablish itself. Programs supporting artificially 
high population levels should be eliminated, and natural predators 
should be introduced to control population levels.149 Until these 
steps are implemented, hunting might be allowed on a controlled 
basis when it is in the best interest to reduce a species' population 
level. Such policies and programs would be for the benefit of the 
wildlife species, however, and not for the benefit of the hunter. 
The third exception to wildlife's right to survival involves the 
commercial taking of wildlife for food consumption. Sportsmen 
who consume the game they kill are not engaged in a commercial 
activity and would not be subject to this exception .. Moreover, 
wildlife that is killed for commercial ·uses other than food also 
would not fall within this exception. In the United States,- fish 
constitutes the greatest volume of wildlife that is killed for com-
mercial uses. Commercial enterprises and the society at large have 
recognized that it is seldom beneficial to eliminate an entire spec-
ies used in commercial sales because there will be nothing to kill 
the next year. Therefore, the concept of sustained or optimum 
yield has developed to determine how much of a species can be 
"harvested" on an annual basis. 
Sustained or optimum yield involves calculating the number 
of animals that can be harvested for human consumption within a 
particular ecosystem over the long run without harming the long-
term productivity of that species. 1150 This concept has become a 
149. Man's elimination of predators in many areas was so effective that human 
intervention will be required to allow predators to return to their natural range. For 
example, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service recently released a pair of red wolves 
in the Cape Romain National Wildlife Refuge near Charleston, South Carolina. 
These wolves had been previously trapped in Texas and bred in Tacoma, Washing-
ton. U.S. Dep't of Interior, Endangered Species Tech. Bull. No. 1 (1978). 
150. The Marine Mammal Protection Act gives the definition of an equivalent 
concept, an "optimum sustainable population" as follows: 
(9) The term "optimum sustainable population" means, with respect 
to any population stock, the number of animals which will result in the 
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sophisticated tool of wildlife management, particularly in the area 
of fisheries. 151 The development of this management system is the 
logical consequence of applying new science and technology to the 
old belief that animals are merely another form of resource which 
can be managed to maximize human utilization. While this con-
cept does have the desirable effect of preserving a species, it ob-
viously does not take into account any legal interest that an indi-
vidual animal may have in preserving its life. The dignity of the 
individual animal should take precedence over scientific justifica-
tions for killing individual animals. 
Several criteria should be met by any commercial entity in the 
business of killing wildlife. First, the commercial entity should 
seek a permit through an administrative process, which would be 
granted only after it is shown that the nutritional value of the 
wildlife is essential for the diet of the society's individual members, 
and that there is no reasonable alternative. This will require the 
difficult balancing of options and economic, environmental and 
political consequences. Second, if wildlife must be taken commer-
cially for food this taking should be subject to the limitations of 
sustained or optimum yield. Current implementation of this con-
cept in fisheries management indicates that such a requirement 
would not be overly burdensome.152 These two criteria would re-
quire the government to conduct a very broad evaluation of the 
nation's food supply needs. Accordingly, the government's ulti-
mate objective should be to phase out this use of wildlife to give 
maximum effect to wildlife's right to noninterference by humans. 
The commercial killing of wildlife for food is intended to repre-
sent a very limited exception to the principle that individual wild-
life should be free from the interference of humans. The example 
of the Alaska polar bear demonstrates that the sustained yield 
maximum productivity of the population or the species, keeping in mind the 
optimum carrying capacity of the habitat and the health of the ecosystem 
of which they form a constituent element. 
16 u.s.c. § 1362(9) (1976). 
151. See Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 
(1976). In describing the contents of the required fisheries management plan, one 
of the elements to be calculated is "the maximum sustainable yield and optimum 
yield" of the affected species. 16 U.S.C. § 1853(a)(3) (1976). As an example of the 
complexity of the scientific discussion, see Scarff, The International Management 
of Whales, Dolphins, and Porpoises: an Interdisciplinary Assessment, 6 EcoLOGY 
L.Q. 323, 387-427 (1977). 
152. Id. 
HeinOnline -- 9 Envtl. L.  277 1978-1979
1979] WILDLIFE fliGHTS 277 
concept may be abused. The polar bear is currently protected from 
hunting by the Marine Mammal Protection Act. 153 Several wildlife 
authorities agree that the polar bear is approaching the maximum 
population that its habitat can support. These authorities argue 
that Alaska should be allowed to take over control of the polar 
bear, with the likely result that hunting permits would be granted 
for limited killing of the polar bear population. Thus, the sustained 
yield concept would be abused by permitting sport hunters to gra-
tify their urge to kill in derogation of the noninterference princi-
ple.154 
C. Species Rights 
Species of wildlife have a right to continued existence because 
each species serves a necessary function in the ecosystem and be-
cause the elimination of a species forecloses one possible line of 
evolution. The preservation of every unique species will promote 
the strength and complexity of the ecosystem.l55 Whenever a spec-
ies is eliminated by human intervention, a wide range of options 
for the future is foreclosed. The House Report on the federal En-
dangered Species Act158 recognized the need for preserving the gene 
pool as a source of further development of the pool and as a data 
bank for science. Since every species, by definition, displays a 
unique set of adaptations to the environment, species preservation 
may help future scientists unlock secrets of nature. 
The basic rights of wildlife species can be simply stated: no 
species of wildlife shall be endangered157 or eliminated by the activ-
ities of human beings. A species that is threatened or endangered 
153. 16 u.s.c. §§ 1371-1372 (1976). 
154. There is another reason why the sport hunter should not be allowed to 
engage in the hunting ritual. Since humans are prohibited from killing other 
humans for personal gratification or any other motive, humans should likewise be 
prohibited froni killing individual·animals to protect their personal dignity and 
interest. However, the enactment of laws in the future to protect the rights of 
wildlife may not alone solve the problem. E.g., although the American bald eagle 
has been protected by federal Jaw since 1940, June 8, 1940, ch. 278, § 1, 54 Stat. 
250 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 668 (1976)), it is still intentionally shot and killed. 
Schueler, Incident at Eagle Ranch, Audubon, May, 1978 at 41. 
155. See note 93 supra and accompanying text. 
156. H.R. Rep. No. 412, 93d Cong., 1st Seas. 4 (1973). 
157. The federal Endangered Species Act of 1973 gives the following broad 
definition: "The term 'endangered species' means any species which is in danger 
of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range .... " 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1532(4) (1976). 
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should not be hunted for any purpose. If any individual or group 
believes that the killing of a threatened or endangered species is 
necessary for human survival, the government is under an affirma-
tive duty to find alternative sources of protein. 
A conflict involving species rights has arisen in Alaska, where 
the natives still hunt and kill the bowhead whale, an endangered 
species. Due to its low population levels, the bowhead whale is 
protected under the Endangered Species Act, 158 the Marine Mam-
mal Protection Act159 and the International Whaling Convention 
(IWC) of 1938.180 While the two federal acts have exempted whal-
ing by native Alaskans, 181 in 1977 the IWC banned any hunting of 
the bowhead whale. 162 The United States had the option of object-
ing to the IWC ruling within 90 days. When it appeared that the 
State Department was not going to object, the Eskimos filed suit 
to compel the Secretary of State to file an objection so they could 
retain their hunting rights. The U.S. District Court for the District 
of Columbia183 ordered the Secretary of State to file an objection 
immediately. The Secretary appealed and the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia found that the Secretary could 
properly decline to object to the IWC ruling since it involved a 
question of foreign policy .164 The court failed to address -and resolve 
the pressing conflict between the interests of an endangered spec-
ies of whale and the Eskimos' right to kill the bowhead. 
The basic concept of species preservation has received world-
wide recognition and is the subject of international treaties185 and 
federallaws. 188 The most difficult problem posed by a commitment 
to species preservation is that presented by species that are pres-
ently threatened or endangered by previous human interference or 
indifference. 187 The challenge facing humans is that of correcting 
prior harmful actions and general lack of concern. The U.S. Fish 
158. 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (1976); 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (1977). 
159. 16 u.s.c. § 1371 (1976). 
160. 52 Stat. 1460, 1461 (1938) (art. 4 protects right whales of which the bow-
head are a subspecies). 
161. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(e) (1976); 16 U.S.C. § 1371 (1976). 
162. Adams v. Vance, 570 F.2d 950, 952-53 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
163. Adams v. Vance, No. 77-1834 (D.D.C. Oct. 21, 1977). 
164. 570 F.2d at 954-57. 
165. E.g., the Convention on Int'l Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna 
& Flora, [1973] 27 U.S.T. 1087, T.l.A.S. No. 8249. 
166. See notes 55-57 supra. 
167. The species are listed in 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (1977). 
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and Wildlife Service has already manifested a sense of obligation 
by forming Recovery Teams for many endangered or threatened 
species. These Recovery Teams include wildlife experts whose job 
involves reporting the present status of the species and recom-
mending how this status can be improved. Their ultimate goal is 
the removal of the species from the threatened or endangered 
list. 168 Thus, the basic idea that humans have a duty to rectify the 
problems they previously created has been recognized and is pres-
ently being carried out. 
The complex federal Endangered Species Act16~ protects spec-
ies presently threatened or endangered.'7° However, once a species 
is removed from its federally protected status, it once again be-
comes fair game for human exploitation .. In order to correct this 
problem it is suggested that species' rights to continued existence 
be recognized whether or not a species has been declared threat-
ened or endangered. This would help to assure the existence of 
each species throughout its entire natural habitat so that each 
species can maximize its role in the ecosystem. Of course, changes 
in species are bound to occur over time due to evolutionary factors 
and changing ecosystems. What is meant to be controlled is short-
term human intrusion into an otherwise long-term natural process. 
D. Proposed Constitutional Amendment 
Since most of the laws and concepts proposed in this article 
could not be justified under the U.S. Constitution, a constitutional 
amendment is proposed as a necessary and effective means to pro-
vide for wildlife rights: 
(1) All wildlife of the classification mammal! bird, amphibian or 
reptile shall have the right to a natural life. No state shall make or 
enforce any law that would deprive any wildlife of life, liberty or 
habitat without due process of law. 
(2) Every species of wildlife shall have the right to exist in its 
168. For an example, see the report on the eastern timber wolf, U.S. Dep't of 
Interiot, Endangered Species Tech. Bull. No. 3 (1977). See also the report on the 
California condor, U.S. Dep't of Interior, Endangered Species Tech. Bull. No.4 
(1977). 
169. See Note, Obligations of Federal Agencies Under Section 7 of the Endan-
gered Species Act of 1973, 28 STANFORD L. REv. 1247 (1976); and Coggins & Hensley, 
Constitutional Limits on Federal Power to Protect and Manage Wildlife: Is the 
Endangered Species Act Endangered?, 61 IowA L. REv. 1099 (1976). 
170. Burr, supra note 6. 
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natural habitat. This right shall not be infringed upon by the United 
States or by any state. 
(3) Congress may enact statutory exceptions to section (1) to per-
mit the economic taking of wildlife, but all such exceptions shall 
expire five years from the effective date of this amendment. 
(4) Congress shall have the power to enforce by appropriate legisla-
tion the provisions of this article. 
Section (1) would protect individual animals and would give 
humans standing to represent wildlife's interests in legal proceed-
ings. This section would not make wildlife's rights absolute but 
would require due process of law before these rights can be in-
fringed upon. Accordingly, this section would deny humans the 
right to destroy wildlife or its habitats unless authorized by the 
government. The government could not authorize the killing or 
capture of wildlife without an appropriate hearing where the inter-
ests of wildlife could be represented by legal counsel. For example, 
a state game agency might be authorized by statute to hold hear-
ings to determine if a particular animal (e.g., wolf, deer, fox) is 
engaging in activity harmful to humans or their property. If such 
were the case, the appropriate relief of capture or killing could be 
authorized. Similarly, before a government or private citizen could 
engage in an activity that would reduce wildlife habitat, an appro-
priate review would be required. 
Like the Endangered Species Act of 1973,171 section (2) of the 
proposed constitutional amendment would require scientific judg-
ment to protect all species of animals. It would prohibit any state 
action which would have a measurable adverse impact on the abil-
ity of a species to continue to exist. Section (3) of the proposed 
amendment would simply provide a phase-in period for those eco-
nomically dependent on the taking of wildlife. Only Congress 
would be authorized to enact exceptions, but this section contains 
an expiration period to reduce improper political temptations. 
The entire animal kingdom would not be protected by the 
proposed amendment, since only most of the vertebrate members 
of the animal kingdom are included. The major category of verte-
brates not listed is fish. While no distinction has been made in this 
Article between the different types of wildlife, practical considera-
tions would ultimately require a limited application of wildlife 
rights theories. As a matter of political and scientific judgment, 
171. 16 u.s.c. § 1531-1543 (1976). 
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the wildlife included in this proposal were chosen because (1) they 
share the same habitat as humans; (2) they share the physiology 
of humans more closely; and (3) they represent the most visible of 
the species with whom humans can identify and understand. 
While the strictest logic might dictate that no dividing line would 
be appropriate, it does not make sense at the present time to use 
the limited resources of the legal system to grant the proposed 
wildlife rights to bean beetles or waterlife too small for the eye to 
see. In conclusion, the language of the proposed constitutional 
amendment could be more or less restrictive and different catego-
ries could be used; certainly any modification would be appropri-
ate which provided a politically realistic alternative that maxim-
izes the legal protection of wildlife's interests. 
CONCLUSION 
Wildlife can be granted legal rights. Wildlife's treatment 
throughout history by various peoples demonstrates that human 
awareness has evolved to a level where wildlife rights can be recog-
nized. Concerns for conservation and preservation have increased 
as humans have depended less upon wildlife as a food source. 
Present attitudes toward sport hunting and pest control can be 
changed without harming either humans or animals. Humans 
must recognize that their activities and those of wildlife are tied 
together and that they are partners in an ongoing enterprise called 
the ecosystem. With this recognition., it will be easier for humans 
to change their attitudes towards animals and to realize that wild-
life can be given species, property and individual rights. By focus-
ing on the ecosystem, humans will realize that they have a duty 
and responsibility toward wildlife. Finally, man's duty to wildlife 
is most likely to be effectuated by enacting a constitutional 
amendment granting wildlife both individual and species rights. 
The American system of jurisprudence can recognize wildlife's in-
terests and capacity to hold rights as a new category of legal per-
sons. 
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